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ABSTRACT 
Military requirements development involves operational commanders conducting 
analyses of a variety of combat scenarios to assess force structure and material 
requirements to meet their military objectives.  The naval component of each command 
determines the number of Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships necessary to keep 
combatant vessels on station.  Without sufficient CLF ships, naval forces are unable to 
sustain continued presence in theater, hampering their ability to support combat 
operations.   Current practice uses spreadsheet-based average consumption models to 
estimate the CLF requirement.  However, these models do not adequately account for 
surges in demand or coordination of shuttle ships between multiple battle groups.  This 
thesis demonstrates an optimization model coupled with a spreadsheet interface to 
identify CLF requirements for campaign level analysis through the use of a fictional 60-
day combat scenario.  We determine that resupply port location is a key determinant of 
shuttle ship quantity and employment.  We also demonstrate an all-shuttle-ship concept 
that eliminates the need for station ships and further reduces the number of CLF ships 
necessary to support the mission. 
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Each Combatant Commander (COCOM) is responsible for contingency planning 
within his area of responsibility (AOR).  This thesis provides a tool that will assist 
COCOM staffs in determining the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) required to support the 
naval component of each contingency operational plan and determine the overall CLF 
force necessary to support each AOR. 
Commander Pacific Fleet N42 has been asked to participate in a CLF Zero 
Baseline review working group and is conducting analyses of third and seventh fleet 
requirements, which it will provide to OPNAV N42 for consolidation with input from 
other fleet logistics offices to determine the overall CLF fleet requirement.  PACFLT 
N42 is currently attempting to build logistics elements into the Naval Simulation System 
(NSS) to capture logistics requirements during contingency planning simulation runs; 
they have requested that we perform parallel analysis with the CLF optimization model 
initially developed in a 2001 thesis by Borden, and further refined through several theses 
with the latest prior version  developed in a 2006 thesis by Doyle, to provide insights into 
asset allocation and utilization for specific scenarios 
The objective of this thesis is to show how the CLF planning tool, in conjunction 
with our newly developed scenario builder user interface, can be used to evaluate the 
CLF requirement for a particular AOR under combat conditions to determine the optimal 
allocation of CLF ships in support of a major combat operation.  We develop a fictional 
scenario to simulate a convergence of a large naval force in a major theater of operations.  
Our analyses offer several layers of insight on the use of optimization for theater 
level CLF planning.  First we analyze the current CLF model to determine if the 
underlying sea routes network and scenario battle group tracks provide enough detail to 
adequately represent the employment of CLF assets in a particular AOR.  We 
demonstrate how to improve the model and provide recommendations on future work to 
expand the sea routes network in areas of interest where resolution is lacking.  Our 
primary analysis outlines how we determine resupply port requirements and CLF ship 
 xvi
composition and employment techniques.  Subsequent analyses demonstrate the positive 
impact the T-AKE has on battle group inventory levels due to that ship’s dual-commodity 
capability, and look at the influence of converting station ships into shuttle ships once in 
the condensed operating area of our scenario.   
The most important finding in our study is the effectiveness of the CLF planning 
model and the flexibility provided by the scenario builder user interface. Together these 
tools provide decision support analysis to the operational commander in determining 
campaign-level CLF requirements.  When conducted on several scenarios of interest, 
these analyses provide information that can then be aggregated to provide the fleet 
commander with a better understanding of his overall fleet requirement, and can aid force 
planners in developing future force structure concepts.  The interface we develop 
provides an efficient way to update CLF composition, allowing an analyst to run several 
models and compare several compositions in a short period of time, and it minimizes the 
possibility of programming errors through automation of input data files. 
In our first model play we demonstrate how the positions of resupply ports play 
an important role in the total number of CLF ships necessary to support combat 
operations.  The longer the cycle time required for traveling to the port of resupply and 
back to the theater of operations, the greater the number of assets required to keep 
combatant ships at appropriate supply levels.  The addition of nearby ports also allows 
for the elimination of station ships because the battle groups no longer need the extended 
capacity to subsist between shuttle ship CONSOLS.  Our analysis of replacing the T-AFS 
and T-AE with the T-AKE demonstrates the added benefits of the T-AKE residual 
capacity even when these are loaded in T-AFS or T-AE configurations.    
The process of conducting these analyses, from basic scenario construction, to 
ensuring network connectivity, adding resupply ports, and reconfiguring the CLF assets, 
helps logistics planners think through the logistics force requirements for any operation.  
These steps identify shortfalls and excesses in planned logistics support and suggest 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Goldwater-Nichols Military Reorganization Act of 1986 places a greater 
emphasis on the role of the Combat Commander (COCOM) by establishing a direct line 
of communication between him and the President of the United States through the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).  This relationship directly influences the 
way we develop and implement military strategy in line with the National Security 
Strategy [NSS, 2006].  Each COCOM is responsible for contingency planning within his 
areas of responsibility (AORs).  CJCS develops the National Military Strategy which 
outlines military priorities as they relate to the National Security Strategy [NMS, 2004].  
This document then guides the COCOM to develop comprehensive contingency 
operational plans (OPLAN) and determine what forces will be required to meet those 
demands.  This thesis provides a tool that will assist the COCOM staff in determining the 
Combat Logistics Force (CLF) structure required to support the naval component of each 
OPLAN and develop the overall CLF force structure necessary to support the COCOM 
AORs.   
A. PACIFIC FLEET COMPONENT FOR THE OPNAV N-42 COMBAT 
LOGISTICS FORCE ZERO-BASELINE REVIEW  
Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Mobility and Combat Logistics (OPNAV 
N42) is currently conducting a Zero-Baseline Review (ZBR) of the CLF to ensure that 
the force structure and capabilities meet fleet requirements at the lowest cost and with 
acceptable risk.  As a member of the ZBR working group, Commander Pacific Fleet N42 
(COMPACFLT N42) is conducting analyses of third and seventh fleet requirements, 
which it will provide to OPNAV N42 for consolidation with input from other fleet 
logistics offices to determine the overall requirements of the force.  COMPACFLT N42 
is currently attempting to build logistics elements into the Naval Simulation System 
(NSS) [SPAWAR, 2001] to capture logistics requirements during contingency planning 
operations simulation runs.  They have requested that we perform parallel analyses with 
the CLF optimization model initially developed in [Borden, 2001], and further refined 
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through several theses with the most recent version developed in Doyle [2006], to 
provide additional insights into asset allocation and utilization for specific scenarios.  The 
format of the data used in COMPACFLT’s NSS simulation runs could not be easily 
extracted by COMPACFLT to build our scenario for the optimization model.  Therefore, 
we developed a similar scenario located in the 7th Fleet AOR which is representative of 
the types of combat scenarios they are modeling.  Through this fictional scenario we 
demonstrate how our system is used as a decision analysis tool and can be adapted to any 
scenario, fleet-specific or global, to provide CLF fleet planning analysis as well as 
operational CLF requirements planning. 
B. CLF FORCE STRUCTURE AND T-AKE PHASED REPLACEMENT 
The ability to provide logistic support to forward-deployed naval forces is 
essential in ensuring that these forces can remain on station indefinitely in any potential 
conflict.  Military Sealift Command (MSC), a subordinate command of Transportation 
Command (TRANSCOM), provides logistics support to naval forces primarily through 
the CLF.  The CLF is currently comprised of 31 vessels of five basic ship types, but it is 
currently undergoing a transformation to 30 ships of three basic types by 2014. This force 
is charged with the delivery of four basic commodities to the fleet; diesel fuel marine 
(DFM), aviation fuel (JP5), ordinance, and dry stores (the last of which includes spare 
parts, mail, dry goods, fresh fruits and vegetables, and frozen goods).   Table 1 indicates 
























DFM  72,000 Stores 220
T-AO 16 3,000 JP5 108,520 Ordinance 0
DFM  7,000 Stores 1,963*
T-AKE 20 14,000 JP7 17,000 Ordinance 3,647*
DFM  62,400 Stores 952
T-AOE 26 3,000 JP5 93,600 Ordinance 2,016
DFM  8,674 Stores 0
T-AE 20 10,000 JP5 1,000 Ordinance 4,928
DFM  8,674 Stores 4,600
T-AFS 21 10,000 JP5 10,000 Ordinance 0
* 5610 stons split between stores and ordinance in various proportions. 40/60 split shown.  
Table 1.   CLF Ship Capabilities (After NWP 4-01.2, 2007) 
This table is read as follows: T-AKE has a maximum sustained speed of 20 kts, a maximum range without 
refueling of 14,000 nautical miles, a cargo DFM capacity of 7,000 bbls, a cargo JP5 capacity of 17,000 
bbls, an ordinance capacity of 1,963 stons and a stores capacity of 3,647 stons.  The stores-to-ordinance 
ratio is shown at 40/60, but is capable of multiple configurations. 
 
The Kaiser Class (T-AO) is capable of carrying about 180,000 barrels of fuel oil, 
and 220 short tons of cargo lube oil, dry stores, and refrigerated containers, at 20 knots. 
Despite this residual dry stores capacity, it is rarely used to transfer dry goods to fleet 
customers.  We will, therefore, ignore this small residual capacity in our analysis.  The 
Supply Class (T-AOE) is the only remaining vessel in the CLF fleet capable of carrying 
significant amounts of all four commodities.  Able to carry 156,000 barrels of fuel oil, 
2,000 short tons of ordnance, 550 short tons of dry stores, and 400 short tons of 
refrigerated stores, at speeds exceeding 26 knots, it is also the only ship in the CLF fleet 
that can keep pace with a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) and is therefore often used as a 
station ship for those battle groups.  The Kilauea Class Ammunition shuttle ship (T-AE) 
is a single commodity delivery ship capable of providing 4,900 short tons of ordinance to 
combat ships via connected or vertical replenishment (CONREP or VERTREP).  
Likewise, the Saturn Class Combat Stores shuttle (T-AFS) is a single-commodity vessel 
providing 4,600 short tons of dry stores via CONREP and VERTREP [MSC, 2008].  
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Figure 1. Current and Future CLF Configuration 
As shown in Figure 1, the Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier (T-AKE), a multi-
commodity delivery ship, will replace the T-AFS and T-AE which will be phased out as 
the new ships become operational.  MSC is scheduled to take ownership of 
approximately two new vessels per year to reach its end strength of 11 total T-AKEs by 
2012.  The Combat Stores shuttle ships (T-AFS) should be completely replaced by the 
end of 2008 with the last Ammunition Shuttle Ship (T-AE) scheduled to depart active 
service by 2010.    
The 30 vessels are divided among the six operational fleets based on several 
allocation studies conducted by the Center for Naval Analysis, OPNAV N42, the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Operations Research Department, and others.  This allocation is 
continually reviewed and is currently being studied through the CLF ZBR at N42.  This 
does not mean that all 30 ships are available for employment. Crew training, leave and 
scheduled depot maintenance remove 10 to 15 percent of the fleet from availability at any 
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global allocation pool.  While this number has proved sufficient to cover the requirements 
of normal peacetime operations, the system becomes strained by combat operations, 
especially in geographically dispersed areas with longer sea lines of communication.  It 
is, therefore, necessary to include analysis of the CLF requirements in planning for major 
combat operations to ensure that the system does not become overwhelmed.  
C. T-AKE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
T-AKE provides a dual commodity logistics lift of ammunition and dry stores to 
station ships and other ships operating with naval forces from supply sources, such as 
friendly ports, and at sea from merchant vessels.  Unique in design, the T-AKE is capable 
of reconfiguring its dry storerooms to accommodate various load quantities of 
ammunition and dry stores.  The Lewis and Clark Class T-AKE is designed to carry 63 
percent of the combined load of the T-AE and the T-AFS dry stores and ammunition and 
100 percent of the refrigerated stores.  Through storeroom conversion of the Multi-
Purpose dry cargo holds, indicated in Figure 2, she is able to achieve better than 100 
percent of T-AE ammunition capacity or T-AFS stores capacity plus maintain full 
capacity for refrigerated stores.  In addition, the refrigerated storerooms can be converted 




Figure 2. T-AKE Storeroom Configuration (From Schwaneke, 2004)  
Multipurpose holds HA and HC can be reconfigured by deck to carry various amounts of dry stores and 
ordinance.  In addition, the Freeze/Chill holds designated FZ can be converted for dry stores. 
 
The ability to convert storerooms is of great benefit to the operational planner 
who can adjust the configuration to best meet the requirements of the specific operation.  
For the purposes of this thesis, we will consider five possible configurations of the T-
AKE.  These configurations, outlined in Table 2, are by no means the only combinations 
possible in the T-AKE, but they represent a range of configuration options and will give 
us insight into the general configurations that will provide the greatest level of support for 
the given scenario.  Further analysis can then be done with these configurations as a 




















DFM  7,000 Stores 682 
T-AKE_AE_Load JP5 17,000 Ordinance 4,928 
DFM  7,000 Stores 4,600 
T-AKE_AFS_Load JP5 17,000 Ordinance 1,010 
DFM  7,000 Stores 1,963 
T-AKE_35_65_Load JP5 17,000 Ordinance 3,647 
DFM  7,000 Stores 2,805 
T-AKE_50_50_Load JP5 17,000 Ordinance 2,805 
DFM  7,000 Stores 3,647 
T-AKE_65_35_Load JP5 17,000 Ordinance 1,963 
Table 2.   T-AKE Scenario Configurations (After NWP 4-01.2, 2007) 
For Example, T-AKE_35_65_Load represents the T-AKE configured with 35 percent of its capacity 
available for dry stores and 65 percent of its capacity available for ordinance.  This vessel is capable of 
carrying a maximum of 7,000 bbls cargo DFM, 17,000 bbls cargo JP5, 1,963 stons stores, and 3,647 stons 
ordinance.     
D. REVIEW OF PAST ANALYSIS FOR CLF FLEET SIZING 
1. Optimizing the Number and Employment of Combat Logistics Force 
Shuttle Ships, with a Case Study of the T-AKE Ship 
Borden [2001] initially developed a CLF optimization model in order to study the 
fleet composition of the Combat Logistics Force.  He used that new model to evaluate a 
new ship class, the T-AKE, to provide recommendations on procurement quantities.  
Analysis over six different scenarios provided key information that aided in the Navy’s 
decision to procure 11 of the new class to recapitalize the aging fleet. In addition, he 
provided insight on how to best load and schedule supporting shuttle ships with the 
correct mix of fuel, ammunition, and consumable stores to resupply each of his distinctly 
different scenarios.  His results show that it is better to reconfigure the T-AKE for each 
required load.  
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2. A Comparison of the Operational Potential and Capability of Two 
Combat Logistics Force Alternatives 
Givens [2002] further developed Borden’s model to evaluate two proposed CLF 
configurations.   Alternative 1, developed by the Center for Naval Analyses, consists of 
three ship classes: T-AKE, T-AO, and T-AOE. Alternative 2, developed and approved by 
the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) [2001], utilizes these 
three classes, but adds a fourth ship class, the T-AOE(X), a next generation, triple 
commodity replenishment ship capable of high speeds that would allow it to keep up with 
its combatant customers.   Givens’ analysis reveals little difference between the two 
alternatives and assisted in the decision not to invest in the T-AOE(X).   
3. Optimizing Global Operations Plans for the Combat Logistics Force 
Cardillo [2004] examined a scenario representing CLF operations in support of 
the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Response Plan [GlobalSecurity.org, 2008d]. His scenario consisted 
of world wide deployment of every available U.S. combatant vessel to support two major 
theater wars. Cardillo’s work challenges the results of a spreadsheet employed by 
OPNAV N81, which evaluates the CLF requirement based on average daily demand.  His 
analysis shows that by using an optimization model to determine CLF requirements based 
on forecasted daily demand instead of average daily demand, the CLF force 
recommendation is more robust and is able to account for large surges in demand due to 
the increase in activity in the major areas of operation. 
4. Optimizing Global Combat Logistics Force Support for Sea Base 
Operations 
DeGrange [2005] further embellished the CLF optimization to study support of a 
sea base during combat and follow-on humanitarian assistance operations. In his 
scenarios, the sea base becomes a large consumer of commodities as it pushes materiel 
ashore in support of combat operations.  In addition, he studies the effects of adjusting 
inventory “safety” and “extremis” levels on consumer ships, and explores the effects of 
the Navy transitioning to a single fuel, rather than separate DFM and JP5. 
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5. Evaluation of Fleet Ownership versus Global Allocation of Ships in 
the Combat Logistics Force 
Doyle [2006] evaluated two alternate ways to manage the CLF fleet, one in which 
each ship operates under a particular fleet ownership, and another in which the ships are 
centrally managed and globally deployed. He introduces an optimization-based 
scheduling tool, and uses it to evaluate a 181-day peacetime scenario tracking daily 
inventories of 13 battle groups to explore the best employment of CLF ships.  Doyle also 
introduces the ability of a shuttle ship to consol more than one battle group prior to 
returning to port for resupply. 
E. THESIS OBJECTIVES 
All previous work conducted with the CLF planning model has been in support of 
fleet sizing and utilization studies for the entire CLF fleet.  The objective of this thesis is 
to show how the CLF planning tool in conjunction with our new scenario builder user 
interface can be used to evaluate the CLF requirement for a particular area of operation 
under combat conditions to determine the optimal allocation of CLF ships in support of a 
major combat operation.  The fictional scenario we use has been developed to simulate a 
convergence of a large naval force in a major theater of operations, and our analyses 
determine the minimum number of CLF ships necessary to meet the daily logistics 
demands.  We also explore an optimal mix of CLF hull types, including several possible 
configurations of T-AKE, in order to provide the greatest level of support with the 
minimum number of assets.  Finally, we discuss the tradeoffs associated with using CLF 
assets as station ships and as shuttle ships, and we show the benefits of a centrally 
managed CLF shuttle fleet in support of specific combat operations. 
The scenario is developed using the Scenario Building interface and will serve as 
an example for the functionality of this interface.  We aim to provide a useful tool to 
enable naval logistics planners to complete CLF asset optimization analysis for scenarios 
ranging from individual combat action to global fleet allocation and allow for CLF force 
sizing analysis which has been demonstrated by the aforementioned thesis work.   
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II. SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT AND USER INTERFACE 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE CLF PLANNING MODEL 
The CLF planning model we use for our analyses, originally developed in 
[Borden , 2001], is a mixed integer program which minimizes the total number of short-
ton-days that the combat fleet experiences stock levels below safety stock in four basic 
commodities.  It optimizes the use of CLF shuttle ships along an underlying sea routes 
network to push the maximum amount of materiel out to the customer ships.  The sea 
routes network is a conglomeration of identified waypoints, resupply ports, and tracks 
traveled by the battle groups built into the scenario.  By overlaying the battle group tracks 
on the existing network, the sea routes program creates new waypoints and rhumb lines at 
intersection points, greatly increasing the fidelity of the network, especially in the area of 
operations.  A Floyd-Warshall all-pairs shortest path algorithm is then used to find the 
optimal path for each class of shuttle ship from each customer, to the best resupply port, 
and then on to another customer over the entire network.   
Data requirements for a scenario include, for each battle group, its composition, 
daily position and employment, daily consumption factors for the four basic 
commodities, and the composition of the CLF for the duration of the scenario.  The 
primary decision variables are binary indicators, each of which indicates that a particular 
shuttle ship replenishes a specific battle group on a specific day.  The objective function 
value is a representation of total short-ton-day shortage experienced by the combat fleet 
within the scenario, and contains increasing penalties for falling below the 50 percent 
safety stock, 25 percent extremis stock levels, and negative stock levels.  An additional 
safety penalty is assessed for each occurrence of underway replenishment to encourage 
moving the maximum amount of materiel in the minimum number of required 
replenishments. 
For further information on the development of the model or the underlying 
mathematics please see [Borden, 2001], [Givens, 2002], [Cardillo, 2004], [DeGrange, 
2005], and [Doyle, 2006]. 
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B. SCENARIO DEFINITION 
1. Background 
The notional, unclassified scenario we have developed to exercise the CLF 
planning model and demonstrate the usefulness of our scenario building tool is based on 
the highly contested chain of islands, rocks, and reefs in the South China Sea known as 
the Spratly Islands.  This chain of geographic features is important to the surrounding 
nations due to its location along the world’s second busiest international sea lane, the 
abundance of natural gas, oil and other resources, and the desire for nations surrounding 
the islands to increase their claims of territorial seas and archipelagic waters.  With the 
increase in economic growth throughout Asia, the consumption of oil by Southeast Asian 
nations is increasing at an exponential rate.  Therefore, many of the nations in the region 
are trying to control the resources in the Spratly Islands as well as the main trade route 
through which oil from the Middle East and Africa is delivered. 
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Figure 3. Spratly Islands Geography and Resources [From GlobalSecurity.org, 2008b] 
Historical disputes over the island chain and its fossil fuel resources have 
included: 
• Indonesia's ownership of the gas-rich Natuna Island group was undisputed until 
China released an official map indicating that the Natunas were in Chinese-
claimed waters.  
• The Philippines' Malampaya and Camago natural gas and condensate fields are in 
Chinese-claimed waters.  
• Many of Malaysia's natural gas fields located offshore Sarawak also fall under the 
Chinese claim.  
• Vietnam and China have overlapping claims to undeveloped blocks off the 
Vietnamese coast. A block referred to by the Chinese as Wan' Bei-21 (WAB-21) 
west of the Spratly Islands is claimed by the Vietnamese in their blocks 133, 134, 
and 135. In addition, Vietnam's Dai Hung (Big Bear) oil field is at the boundary 
of waters claimed by the Chinese.  
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• Maritime boundaries in the gas-rich Gulf of Thailand portion of the South China 
Sea have not been clearly defined. Several companies have been signed 
exploration agreements but have been unable to drill in a disputed zone between 
Cambodia and Thailand.  [from GlobalSecurity.org, 2008c]. 
In our scenario, country red (the aggressor) invades several of the islands under 
Philippine control.   The Philippines have  requested U.S. assistance in accordance with 
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 that states  the United States will assist in the defense 
of Philippine armed forces, vessels, planes, and supply ships “that may be attacked, no 
matter where, by a hostile force” [DFA, 2008].  The United States has determined that it 
will send three Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) and an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) 
from the 5th and 7th Fleet AORs to the area and will follow with a fourth CSG, 2nd ESG, 
and two Amphibious Task Forces (ATFs) in order to restore the territorial integrity of the 
Philippines and their island claims.  
2. Scenario Assumptions 
The following assumptions have been made in scenario development in order to 
concentrate our focus on the seventh fleet AOR and evaluate the effectiveness of the CLF 
assets assigned to support combat operations. 
• Requirements outside of the operating area will not have an impact on the 
availability of assets in the area.  This will allow assets to be allocated specifically 
for the operation and not pulled to fulfill other requirements. 
• Minimum safety stock level for fuel and stores will be 50 percent of capacity and 
critical stock levels will be at 25 percent of capacity. 
• All battle groups are available at N+0 day and will begin immediate transit to the 
area of operation.  They will arrive in theater based on transit time from initial 
location and maximum transit speeds of 21 knots for CSGs and 13 knots for ESGs 
and ATFs. 
• Shuttle ships will complete replenishment of one battle group prior to returning to 
port for resupply.   When a battle group is scheduled for UNREP it will be refilled 
to the minimum of 100 percent of capacity or the amount of commodity available 
on the delivery ship. 
• Ships already in the area of operation will begin the scenario at 100 percent of 
capacity in all commodities. Battle Groups transiting from outside the theater of 
operations will enter the theater at 70 percent capacity in all commodities.  At this 
point the ships will fall under the administrative and operational chain of 
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command of seventh fleet.  As demonstrated in [Doyle, 2006], fleet assignment 
becomes important if we restrict the CLF ships to only replenishing those ships 
assigned to the same fleet.  As an example, a scenario in the central Pacific may 
include ships assigned to seventh fleet located in eastern Asia and third fleet 
located off the Pacific coast.  In a fleet allocation of CLF ships, seventh fleet CLF 
ships would not be permitted to replenish 3rd Fleet combatants. 
• On each day of the scenario, each Battle Group will be in exactly one of the 
following six employment states: “In Port,” “Pre-Assault,” “Assault,” “Sustain,” 
or “Disregard.”  A Battle Group’s state determines its daily consumption of each 
of the four basic commodities, with the special states “In Port” and “Disregard” 
having no associated consumption and the other four states having consumptions 
as outlined in Figure 10, below. 
• The combat fleet and CLF fleet will not suffer any losses, combat or mechanical, 
during the scenario. (Note that loss of a combatant makes the resulting logistical 
problem easier, and therefore, this provides conservative consumption for 
combatants.  The loss of CLF ships can be evaluated by simply modifying the 
scenario to remove these ships.).   
3. Fleet Composition and Timeline 
 
Table 3.   Scenario Timeline 
This table represents the flow of ships into the theater of operation during our scenario.  “N + 0” day is the 
date of notification for all units that will be involved in the operation.   This day is then used as a point of 
reference for the remainder of the scenario. 
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The initial response force will consist of four battle groups, three CSGs and one 
ESG.  CSG1 stationed at Yokosuka, Japan, has left port and will be in the operating area 
on day N+6.  ESG 1, also operating near Yokosuka will be on station at N+9.  CSG2 is 
transiting across the Pacific and is off the coast of Guam at day N+0 with a theater arrival 
date of N+6.  CSG3 is transiting the Red Sea and will arrive in theater at N+13.  These 
forces will enter combat operations upon arrival, shifting their consumption rates from 
pre-assault to assault levels, and will maintain this consumption until N+25 day at which 
time all groups will switch to sustaining rates.  The initial response force battle group 
configurations are outlined in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Battle Group Composition – Initial Response Force 
Surges in demand will continue to be added to the system as four augmenting 
battle groups arrive on scene.  These battle groups originate from the continental United 
States and Hawaii with time on station directly related to time-distance calculations 
utilizing the maximum speeds of 21 knots for the CSG and 13 knots for the ATFs and 
ESG.   CSG4 from San Diego and ESG2 operating off the coast of Hawaii will arrive on 
station on day N+18 at which time they will shift to assault consumption rates until 
N+25.  ATF1 departs San Diego and will arrive on N+25 followed by ATF2 from 
Norfolk which arrives on N+37.  Both ATF forces will enter theater with a sustain 




day to N+60 we will maintain a steady state of demand and examine how well various 
CLF configurations are able to meet this demand.  The configuration of the battle groups 
contained in the augmenting forces is listed in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Battle Group Composition – Augmenting Force 
C. THE SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOOL 
 
Figure 6. Scenario Building Tool Initialization Screen  
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The scenario development tool we have developed is a Microsoft Excel – Visual 
Basic for Applications (Excel/VBA) [Microsoft, 2008] product that, when paired with the 
GAMS, [GAMS, 2008], CLF planning model, provides an extremely powerful and 
planner-friendly mechanism for operational or strategic planners.  Building each scenario 
requires the planner to determine the daily position and employment of each battle group 
over the span of the planning horizon.  This information can be input into the graphical 
user interface that automatically builds data tables for each battle group and CLF ship 
that will be assigned.  The true power of the tool lies in its ability to create the data files 
needed to run the GAMS CLF model at the push of a button.  This allows the planner to 
make modifications to the scenario, create new GAMS input files, and then run the 
scenario without having to modify the code of the underlying optimization model, and 
with a much lower risk of transcription errors. 
1. Logistics Planning Factors 
The logistics planning factors used in our scenario come directly from the Naval 
Warfare Publication Sustainment at Sea [NWP, 2007].  These factors are used in 
determining the aggregate daily consumption rates and maximum aggregate capacities of 
each battle group in each of the four commodities.  In addition, this document contains 
the speed, range, and capacities of each class of CLF ship.   
The scenario builder allows the planner to change these consumption factors and 
ship capabilities through a menu located on the standard tool bar at the top of the 
spreadsheet.  The drop down menu, displayed in Figure 7 offers the options to change 
CLF capabilities, ship capacities, or ship consumption planning factors.   The planner 
may also change the NWP 4-01.2 data to conform with any future changes to the logistics 
planning factors.  Changes to the NWP data will change the default settings for logistics 





Figure 7. Editing Logistics Planning Factors 
2. Creating a New Scenario 
 
Figure 8. User Input Screen 
After selecting the “Start New Scenario” button on the initialization page (Figure 
6), you will be taken to the main user interface screen shown in Figure 8.  This screen 
contains all of the buttons necessary for a planner to build, edit, and run a scenario in the 
GAMS model.  The functionality for saving and loading scenarios has not yet been 
developed so planners save each scenario as a separate Excel workbook.  
The planner must first create the battle groups that will be involved in the 
scenario.  A battle group is defined as any ship or group of ships that will operate 
together.  Capacities and consumption rates will be aggregated for the ships in the battle 
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group and the battle group will be considered a single entity for replenishment purposes.  
Battle groups will be identified by type (CSG, ESG, independent operations, etc.), name 
of flagship, and place of origin or location at the start of the scenario.  A hull number or 
other identifier may be used in place of the flagship name.  The planner also needs to 
provide the number of each ship type attached to the group.  An example of the battle 
group input form can be found in Figure 9.  Note that any CLF ships added to the battle 
groups are considered station ships and will not be used as shuttle ships in the scenario, 
but will increase the overall capacity of the battle group in the commodities they carry. 
 
Figure 9. Battle Group Input Form  
CSG Lincoln based in Everett, Washington consists of 1 CVN, 1 CG, 2 DDGs, 1 FFG, and 1 T-AOE 
station ship.   The battle group configuration is used to calculate aggregate consumption and capacity for 
each of the basic commodities.  
 
Completion of this step results in the creation of a new employment worksheet for 
each of the battle groups entered.  The program also calculates the aggregate 
consumption and capacity numbers for each of the battle groups in each of the basic 
commodities and places that information in a separate table, an example of which can be 





Figure 10. Battle Group Daily Consumption and Capacities 
Table reads as follows:  The aggregate consumption for CSG_1_Yoko of DFM is 8,559 bbls/day at the pre-
assault consumption rate, 4,615 bbls/day at the assault rate, and 4,615 bbls/day at the sustain rate.  The 
battle group has an aggregate capacity of 127,260 bbls.  
 
After entering the battle groups for the planning scenario, the planner must input 
the projected daily employment information into the workbook.  This information 
includes daily position by latitude and longitude, daily employment state (In Port, Pre-
Assault, Assault, Sustain, or Disregard), fleet assignment, and whether the battle group is 
available for UNREP on that day.  This information must be entered for each day of the 
planning horizon and for each battle group in the scenario in the form shown in Figure 
11.  If the planner exits prior to completing entries for the entire spanning horizon, he is 
given the option to auto fill the remaining days with the last entered position and 
employment, disregard the battle group for the remainder of the scenario, return to the 
entry form to complete entering employment data, or leave the data blank.  If the planner 
chooses to leave the data blank, then he must return and fill in that data prior to creating 





Figure 11. Battle Group Employment Form 
Completion of this form will calculate and display the position, employment, 
daily consumption, fleet assignment and availability for replenishment on the spreadsheet 
for each battle group as seen in Figure 12.  Availability for replenishment defaults to 
“Available” unless the “BG Unavailable” button is selected for that day.  (Note that 
ordinance consumption for Pre-Assault has been modified to .00001 in order to prevent 




Figure 12. Battle Group Daily Employment Worksheet 
This figure reads as follows:  On day 1, ESG_1_Yoko is located at 35.1360 degrees latitude, -139.7223 
degrees longitude and is operating at the Pre-Assault level of consumption.  At this level, ESG_1_Yoko 
consumes 11,266 bbls of DFM, 116 bbls of JP5, 31 stons of stores, and 0 stons of ordinance.   The ship is 
available for replenishment indicated by the 1 in the “Available for hit” column and is assigned to the 7th 
Fleet  AOR.  The “Available for Unrep” column is not currently used at this time but is included for further 
expansion of the model and defaults to 0. 
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The final step in scenario development is identifying the CLF shuttle ships that 
will be available for scheduling during the scenario.  Shuttle ships are identified by CLF 
ship type (T-AE, T-AFS, etc.), and a name identifier which can be any alphanumeric 
combination.  It is also necessary to identify the fleet assignment of the shuttle ship.  This 
designation will restrict the shuttle ship from being scheduled to replenish ships outside 
of its operational fleet.  Each added ship is placed on a CLF assets worksheet and the 
speed, range and commodity capacities are filled in based on ship type.  In addition, the 
ship is added to the CLF-Battle Group commodities matrix that indicates which 
commodities each customer battle group can receive from each delivery ship.  For the 
purpose of our analysis T-AOs only deliver DFM and JP5, T-AEs deliver ordinance, T-
AFS deliver stores, T-AKEs deliver stores and ordinance, and T-AOEs deliver all 
commodities. 
3. Scenario Editing 
 
Figure 13. Scenario Editing Options 
The scenario editing functions allow the planner to make modifications to the 
current scenario once initial data has been entered.  “Edit BG Composition” (Figure 13) 
will automatically recalculate aggregate consumption numbers and capacities for the 
battle group and update the battle group daily employment worksheet with these figures. 
 24
Updating battle group employment allows the planner to either amend existing 
data or to add additional days of employment.  Amending data will prompt the planner to 
choose a day on which to start amending.  If the planner does not continue changes 
through the end of the planning horizon, he is prompted for auto fill options.  If the 
planner does not wish to change the remaining data in the spreadsheet, he selects “Leave 
Blank.” Appending data will take the planner to the next available day for scheduling.  If 
the planner adds data outside of the planning horizon, this data will be ignored upon 
creation of data files. 
Deleting a battle group completely removes it from the workbook.  The daily 
employment worksheet is removed and all entries in other worksheets are purged.  
Likewise, deleting CLF shuttles removes the CLF shuttle ship from the CLF assets 
worksheet and the CLF-Battle Group commodities matrix.  
The “Recalculate Daily Consumption” button should be used any time the planner 
makes changes to the battle group daily employment worksheets directly without going 
through the user form.  It will loop through the existing battle groups and ensure that the 
daily consumption factors match the employment consumption level selected for each 
day.  
4. File Manipulation 
 
Figure 14. File Manipulation Options 
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The “Create GAMS Files” button (see Figure 14) will create 15 comma-
separated-value (CSV) files which are read into the GAMS model prior to model 
execution.  This relieves the planner from having to manipulate each occurrence of a 
battle group or CLF ship in the GAMS code with each change in the scenario.  Run this 
function prior to your GAMS model play, accomplished by pushing the “Solve” button.    
The results, read into a separate worksheet in the workbook, are created in a separate file 
by the GAMS solver and formatted to allow quick graphing of the saw-tooth inventory 
state charts for each commodity.  This file contains information on daily inventory levels, 
replenishment events, and consumption for each battle group in each of the four 
commodities.   The “Results” button reads this data into your workbook and opens the 
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III. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
A. SYNOPSIS 
This analysis reveals several insights from the use of optimization for theater level 
CLF planning.   
Initially, we analyze the current CLF model to determine if the underlying sea 
routes network and scenario battle group tracks will provide enough fidelity to adequately 
support modeling movements of  CLF ships (that must stay on our sea-routes, rather than 
steam on arbitrary tracks) in a particular AOR.  We demonstrate how to improve the 
model and provide recommendations on future work to expand the sea routes network in 
areas of interest where fidelity is lacking.   
Our primary analysis will outline how we determine resupply port requirements 
and CLF ship composition and employment techniques.  Although the analysis here is 
based on a fictional combat scenario, the same methods apply to any scenario.  This 
affords operational staffs the ability to conduct analysis on all scenarios of interest and 
aggregate the results to form recommendations on overall force structure requirements 
while also defining specific requirements for the contingency operation.   
Additional analyses demonstrate the positive contribution the T-AKE makes to 
battle group inventory levels due to its dual-commodity capability, and also evaluates the 
influence of converting station ships into centrally controlled shuttle ships once forces are 
in the condensed operating area of the combat theater.   
B. SEA ROUTES NETWORK AND BATTLE GROUP TRACK 
INTEGRATION 
The underlying sea routes network, as discussed in the brief summary of the 
model, is comprised of ports and waypoints throughout the globe that are connected by 
fast and slow arcs.  Slow arcs are found between nodes passing through known 
geographic slow transit areas such as the Suez Canal or the Straits of Malacca, and transit 
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of such an arc takes a fixed amount of time, regardless of ship class. These areas increase 
the time it takes for any ship to traverse through the geographically restricted area.  Fast 
arcs allow CLF ships to travel at the top speed indicated in the model for each type.  Full 
layout of the sea routes network is illustrated in [Doyle, 2006].  
The battle group track integrator expands the sea routes network under the 
assumption that any track over which the battle group traverses may also be used by a 
CLF ship.  This expansion is accomplished by adding additional nodes and arcs in the 
network wherever a battle group track crosses the existing sea routes network. 
 
Figure 15. Sea Routes and Battle Group Tracks for Spratly Island Scenario 
Solid lines represent existing sea routes arcs from [Doyle, 2006].  Dotted Lines indicate battle 
group tracks entering from the Pacific Ocean to the east.  Dashed lines are added sea route arcs which 
increase the fidelity of the network and ensure integration of battle group tracks. 
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Figure 15 shows the sea routes network in the area of the Spratly Islands as it 
existed prior to our study, depicted by solid lines.  The dotted lines indicate the tracks of 
three of the battle groups that arrive from the west and enter the theater of operations 
following three different lines of approach.  Close examination of these two sets of lines 
reveals that the last intersection of the two southern battle group tracks and the existing 
sea route arc is in the vicinity of Guam.  Had we run the model without additional arcs 
added, CLF ships would have had to traverse from a port of resupply to this intersection 
point and then follow the battle group track back to the theater of operations, adding 
needless, unrealistic days of transit to the model.   
To avoid these artificial increases in turn-around time, we have added several arcs 
to the existing network in the theater of operations as shown by the dashed lines in Figure 
15.  This ensures that our battle group tracks and sea routes network are well connected 
and integrated allowing for freedom of navigation throughout the AOR.  Changes of this 
nature currently require modification to the existing GAMS model but changes to the 
graphical user interface would allow arc and node adjustments as necessary.  
C. IDENTIFYING LOGISTICS BASE SHORTFALLS 
Positions of logistics resupply ports play a key role in the overall performance of 
our CLF composition.  For our initial run of the model we utilized a baseline mix of CLF 
ships containing three T-AFSs, one T-AO, and one TAE.  As expected, this mix of assets 
did not perform particularly well for our scenario for two reasons.  First, the Spratly 
Islands AOR is geographically removed from the key logistics ports of Singapore, 
Okinawa, Yokosuka, and Guam identified in the sea routes network used in previous 
thesis work.  Second, the mix of five CLF ships is inadequate to support a combat fleet of 
47 ships operating under combat and sustaining consumption levels.  We will explore the 
later in section E of this chapter. 
The two major sea ports utilized by CLF assets in our initial run are Singapore 
and Okinawa.  Singapore lies approximately 800 nautical miles from the nearest battle 
group’s assigned operating box, and Okinawa is approximately 1,000 nautical miles 
removed.  To illustrate the impact this has on force requirements, consider our T-AO. 
 30
Capable of maximum sustained speeds of 16 knots, the T-AO can travel a maximum of 
384 nautical miles per day.  Port turnaround time is set at two days for each port giving 
the T-AO a complete turnaround time of roughly seven days for Singapore and eight days 
for Okinawa.  Given the assumption that the T-AO only consoles with one battle group 
before returning to port to resupply and given the presence of eight battle groups in our 
scenario, each of the battle groups should experience a cycle time of between 64 and 72 
days between fuel replenishments.     
An initial review of the daily consumption planning factors indicates that JP-5 and 
ordinance are the driving factors in determining the frequency of replenishment events 
required.  CSG_1_Yoko containing one CVN,  one CG, three DDGs, one T-AO, and one 
T-AE, has a DFM assault consumption rate of  4,615 barrels of fuel per day and a 
capacity for 122,029 barrels.  By simple division, this yields 26.4 days before the battle 
group completely exhausts its DFM supply.  Furthermore, CSG_1_Yoko will fall below 
the 50 percent safety stock level in 13.2 days and will hit the 25 percent extremis level in 
19.8 days, demonstrating the inadequacy of a 64-day cycle time.  To meet the demand 
and maintain stock above safety levels for each battle group requires a dedicated T-AO 
ship for each of the eight groups.  The sustainability cycles for each battle group in each 
commodity are listed in Table 4.  
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Table 4.   Days Sustainability without Resupply per Commodity 
For CSG_1_Yoko, DFM will reach minimum safety level of 50 percent in 13.2 days, minimum extremis 
level of 25 percent in 19.8 days, and will completely exhaust fuel supply by 26.4 days without receiving a 
CONSOL. 
 
To further emphasize the importance of geographically local resupply ports, we 
added Subic Bay, Philippines and Muara, Brunei, to the model as full service ports.   
Subic Bay Freeport (SBF) lies approximately 350 nautical miles from AOR and has long 
been recognized for its strategic location at the center of the fastest growing markets in 
Asia. It is at the hub of the region and all major cities in Asia are within easy reach by sea 
or air. Aside from its strategic location, SBF has a deepwater seaport that is capable of 
handling the largest ships ever built, demonstrated by its history of supporting the U. S. 
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7th Fleet [SBF, 2008].  Muara, Brunei, lays 200 miles south of the Spratly Islands.  The 
dedicated container terminal at Muara Port is equipped with up-to-date machinery and 
operated by experienced and skilled manpower that delivers a high level of efficiency and 
productivity [BPD, 2008].  After adding these two ports we run the model again 
maintaining our baseline CLF configuration of three T-AFSs, one T-AO, and one T-AE.   
 
Figure 16. Inventory Levels for 3 T-AFS/1 T-AO/1 T-AE without Subic Bay and 
Maura available   
Examining the “DFM Daily Inventory Levels” chart, the dashed line located at .5 represents the minimum 
safety stock level of 50 percent for this commodity.  The dotted and dashed line at .25 represents the 
extremis stock level of 25 percent.  Each of the sawtooth lines represents the daily stock position of a battle 
group in our scenario.  The goal is to get all of these lines above the 50 percent threshold.  This 
representation will remain consistent throughout our analyses. 
 33
 
Figure 17. Inventory Levels for 3 T-AFS/1 T-AO/1 T-AE with Subic Bay and Maura 
available 
The arrows illustrate the shift of the inventory position lines up and to the right indicating an overall 
improvement in CLF cycle time and overall inventory levels. 
 
Comparing the two sets of graphs above it is apparent that in either case the CLF 
ships are inadequate to meet the demands in the scenario.  However, there is a noticeable 
shift up and to the right in the graphs of Figure 17, particularly in stores, once the ports of 
Subic Bay and Muara are added to the system.  This indicates that the ships are able to 
maintain stock levels for a longer period of time after scenario initiation and are able to 
maintain higher stock levels for each battle group throughout the campaign.  All ships are 
now capable of a maximum of four days turn-around time, reducing the fuel cycle time 
for the battle groups in the previous example from 64 to 32 days.    This result verifies the 
benefit of establishing local ports of resupply whenever practicable.  The ports of Subic 
Bay and Muara will remain in our network for the remainder of our analyses. 
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D. THE T-AKE EFFECT 
Due to its scheduled replacement of the T-AE and T-AFS by the year 2010, we 
swap T-AKEs into the scenario for the three T-AFS and one T-AE in our baseline run.  
We conduct a one-for-one swap of assets configuring three of the T-AKEs to carry 100 
percent of the T-AFS load and one to carry 100 percent of the T-AE load.   This gives us 
an overall CLF mix of three T-AKE_AFS, one T-AKE_AE and one T-AO.   
 
 
Figure 18. Stores and Ordinance Inventory Levels 3 T-AFS/1 T-AE/1 T-AO 
 
Figure 19. Stores and Ordinance Levels 3 T-AKE_AFS/1 T-AKE_AE/1-TAO 
The inventory levels of ordinance in the Figures 18 and 19 shows a strong 
improvement when converting to T-AKEs, but there appears to be a slight decline in the 
stores inventory levels for several of the battle groups.  The increase in ordinance levels 
is directly related to the residual capacity of the T-AKE in a T-AFS configuration which 
allows it to carry 1,010 short tons of ordinance in addition to 100 percent of the dry stores 
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load of the T-AFS.  The decline in stores inventory is caused by the change in CLF 
utilization to try to minimize the time that the battle groups spend below extremis in 
ordinance inventory.  In practice the model is trading the lower penalty associated with a 
drop below safety stock of stores to avoid the higher penalty awarded for a drop into 
extremis of ordinance.  If the employment schedule of CLF assets remained the same in 
both runs of the model we would expect to see a slight increase in stores inventory levels 
due to the residual capacity of a T-AKE in a T-AE configuration of an additional 682 
short tons for stores. 
E. OPTIMIZING THE CONFIGURATION OF CLF ASSETS 
To optimize the total CLF configuration, we use an iterative process.  First we run 
the model for a baseline mix of assets that we think will meet the overall demand.  We 
then analyze the sawtooth inventory level diagrams for this run to determine what 
shortfalls are present.  From the baseline run shown in Figure 17, our initial configuration 
is deficient in DFM, JP5, and ordinance with several battle groups completely running 
out of each commodity.  Stores inventory levels are satisfactory for six of the eight battle 
groups because we have three T-AFSs operating on a four-day cycle that allows for each 
battle group to be hit once every eight days.  The information contained on these charts 
not only shows inventory deficiencies, but also allows the decision maker to assess the 
risk of ships falling below the safety and extremis threshold.  In this case we decided that 
the stores levels provided by the three T-AKEs in a T-AFS configuration is acceptable 
and so we did not add any additional assets specifically for the delivery of stores. 
Our analysis of the fuel levels for the battle group caused us to add an additional 
two T-AOs to the CLF composition for our second iteration but this number was also 
inadequate to improve the overall inventory levels of DFM or JP5.  For our third iteration 
we ran the model with a composition of three T-AKE_AFSs, one T-AKE_AE, and four 






Figure 20. Inventory Levels for 3 T-AKE_AFS/1 T-AKE_AE/4 T-AO 
After completion of this iteration, we assess JP5 levels as still dangerously low for 
our amphibious battle groups which may be an issue unless we can assume that all 
amphibious borne aircraft will be shore based during this portion of the operation.  If this 
is the case, then we should modify the JP5 consumption planning factors for these battle 
groups to reflect this and re-run the model to see if the problem is resolved.  Assuming 
that the amphibious ships are acting as lily pad refueling stations for marine aircraft, it 
appears that we will need an additional one to two refueling assets along with an 
additional T-AKE.  Our DFM inventory levels are acceptable but our JP5 numbers are 
not.  Therefore, configuring an asset to carry a larger ratio of JP5 to DFM may be more 
beneficial to the overall system.  A final confirmation run could then be used to verify the 
appropriate levels are reached. 
Considering the levels for stores and ordinance in Figure 20, the shortages appear 
more severe for ordinance.  This information is useful in trying to determine which 
configuration of T-AKE is appropriate to try to increase both of these commodities 
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simultaneously.  In this case it may be beneficial to attempt adding a T-AKE in a 35 
percent stores and 65 percent ordinance configuration to augment the existing force.  
While we did not conduct the model run for this mix of assets, we would expect an 
improvement in each of the commodities.  We may find, however, that a T-AKE with a 
50/50 stores-to-ordinance load or in an AE configuration may perform better.  The 
benefit of the user interface is the ability to quickly change CLF asset composition and 
rerun the model to provide the comparisons for these varying configurations of the T-
AKE. 
F. IMPACT OF ALLOWING BATTLE GROUP STATION SHIPS TO ACT 
AS SHUTTLE SHIPS 
Revisiting the battle group composition defined in the scenario in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 there are a total of six station ships assigned to the battle groups.  The CLF 
model sees these assets as an integrated part of the battle group that adds to the overall 
capacity of the group in the commodities carried by the shuttle.  When you consider the 
three T-AKE_AFS/1 T-AKE_AE/4 T-AO composition that we ran previously, we utilize 
eight shuttle ships and six station ships, approximately half of the total CLF fleet.  This 
raises the question: How important is the added capacity of the station ships?   
To answer this question, we started with the extreme case of removing all station 
ships from their battle groups and not augmenting the CLF shuttle ship force.  This 
results in little change in the overall performance of the system although we did see an 
increase in the frequency of UNREP events that each battle group experienced.  
Superficially this may seem like a restriction impeding the battle groups mission 
capability more often for replenishment.  However, the battle groups with station ships 
had to receive replenishments from their station ships on a regular basis to distribute the 
added capacity.  Station ship replenishment is not captured in the current CLF model.  
The locality of resupply ports also plays an important role in this negligible difference 
because the battle groups do not require the extra capacity of the shuttles to carry them 
between shuttle ship consoles. 
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Our next step was to reintroduce two T-AOEs that had been removed. 
Traditionally, these assets accompany carrier battle groups as station ships, but provide 
the greatest overall impact as shuttle ships due to the increased speed and capacity for all 
four commodities.  This practice is common in the 5th Fleet AOR where station ships are 
detached from their battle groups upon arrival and report to CTF-53 who schedules all 
replenishments in theater.  The resulting composition for our scenario run is three 
TAKE_AFSs, one T-AKE_AE, four TAOs and two T-AOEs for a total of 10 CLF assets. 
 
Figure 21. Inventory Levels for 3 T-AKE_AFS/1 T-AKE_AE/4 T-AO/2 T-AOE 
Compared to the inventory levels achieved by our battle groups with 
accompanying station ships shown in Figure 20, the overall performance of the system 
without station ships and with two T-AOEs acting as shuttles improves in each of the 
four commodities with particularly large improvements found in JP5 and ordinance.  This 
result demonstrates that for a confined area of operations such as the Spratly Islands, it is 
far more effective to use your CLF assets as shuttle ships if we have resupply ports close 
enough to eliminate the need for added station ship capacity.  Furthermore, the addition 
of the T-AOEs as multi-commodity shuttles provide a greater service level to the combat 
fleet while allowing a total CLF asset reduction of four vessels (three T-AOs/one T-AE 
station ships) bringing the total needed to support the operation to ten.   
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FOLLOW-ON STUDIES 
A. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN WE DRAW? 
The most important finding in our study is the effectiveness of the CLF planning 
model and the planner’s scenario builder interface to provide decision support to the 
operational commander in determining campaign level CLF requirements.  Conducted on 
several scenarios of interest, the information gained from this tool can then be aggregated 
to provide the fleet commander with a better understanding of his overall fleet 
requirement and can aid force planners in developing future force structure decisions.  
The interface provides an efficient way to update the CLF composition allowing several 
model plays to be done and various compositions to be compared and contrasted. 
In our first model run, we demonstrated how the positions of resupply ports play 
an important role in the total number of CLF ships necessary to support combat 
operations.  The longer the cycle time required for traveling to the port of resupply and 
back to the theater of operations, the greater the number of assets required to keep 
combatant ships at appropriate supply levels.  The addition of nearby ports also allows 
for the elimination of station ships because the battle groups no longer need the extended 
capacity to subsist between shuttle hits.  This further reduces the total number of CLF 
ships required for the operation. 
Our analysis of replacing the T-AFS and T-AE with the T-AKE demonstrates the 
added benefits of the residual capacity even when these ships are loaded out in T-AFS or 
T-AE configurations.   While we only examine the T-AFS and T-AE configurations in 
our model runs, the ability to split these ships into multiple configurations provides an 
added layer of flexibility not available in previous classes of ship 
Perhaps the most interesting result is eliminating station ships from the battle 
groups and creating an all shuttle ship CLF support force.  This practice, common in the 
smaller region of the 5th Fleet AOR, is only practical given a condensed AOR with local 
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ports of resupply, but greatly reduces the number of CLF ships required to meet the 
overall demand of combatants in the scenario.  This result should lead operational 
planners to explore an all shuttle ship force where the preconditions are met.   
B. FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND MODEL 
IMPROVEMENTS 
1. Modeling CLF UNREP Boxes (Gas Station Model) 
The original PACFLT scenario required that battle groups transit to designated 
UNREP boxes for security and maneuverability reasons.  The current model requires 
shuttle ships to travel to the battle group to provide resupply.  Additional work should be 
done to allow the optimization of replenishment such that the CLF asset time distance 
calculation would account for the distance of the battle group to the UNREP box and the 
distance of the CLF ship to the same box.     
2. Changes to Battle Group Composition Mid-Scenario 
Currently our user interface calculates static capacity and consumption numbers 
based on the composition of the battle group when initially added to the scenario.  The 
model itself allows ships to pass in and out or between battle groups as the scenario 
progresses.  User interface modifications for this would allow, for example, modeling the 
transition of station ships to shuttle ships as they check in (INCHOP) to 5th Fleet AOR. 
3. Expansion of the Sea Routes Network 
Our scenario identified some deficiencies in the robustness of the sea routes 
network near a particular AOR.  It would be beneficial to look at the probable areas of 
operation for U. S. naval forces and expand the network in those areas to ensure that the 
paths of shuttle ships are consistent with the paths likely to be taken and that battle 
groups are unable to enter an area of operations are guaranteed to intersect the underlying 
sea routes network. 
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4. Determining Optimal T-AKE Configurations 
Part of the power of the dual commodity T-AKE is its ability to convert storage 
into any of multiple configurations in order to provide the right mix for the given 
scenario.  In our scenario we arbitrarily chose five T-AKE configurations and only used 
two in our analysis.  Additional scenario analyses could help determine an optimal 
configuration of the T-AKE that provides the greatest flexibility across a wide range of 
possible future events. 
5. Combat Scenario Development 
Each combatant commander has a list of Major Contingency Operations (MCOs) 
that he must plan towards and develop requirements to support.  It would be beneficial to 
develop a catalogue of scenarios based on these MCOs that could accompany this tool for 
analysis in each major theater.  This work would most likely become classified, and 
would require the installation of the GAMS model and user interface on a classified 
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APPENDIX.   LOGISTICS PLANNING FACTORS  
A. CLF CAPABILITIES BY SHIP TYPE  
 
Table 5.   CLF Capabilities and Capacity for each Commodity (After NWP 4-01.2) 
T-AO_Single_Hull has a maximum sustained speed of 16 knots, a maximum unreplenished range of 3,000 
nautical miles and capacities of 72,000 barrels for DFM, 108,520 barrels for JP5, 220 short tons of stores 
and 0 short tons of ordinance.  
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B. SHIP CAPACITIES 
 
Table 6.   Ship Capacities for each Commodity (After NWP 4-01.2) 
The CVN has a capacity for 0 barrels of DFM, 74,642 barrels of JP5, 1,710 short tons of stores and 1,765 
short tons of ordinance.   
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C. SHIP CONSUMPTION FACTORS 
 
Table 7.   Ship Consumption by Employment (After NWP 4-01.2) 
A DDG51 consumes an average of 1,200 barrels/day of DFM when in pre-assault employment, 646 
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